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NOTES
THE BASES FOR PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Since the case of Rex v. Holland' in 1792 the common law courts have
repeatedly denied the existence of any power to compel criminal discovery.
A modern trend,' however, has been to allow discovery in criminal cases at
the discretion of the trial court.8 Only a few states expressly purport to
maintain the old common law position,' while others have simply denied
discovery under the facts of the case.'
The new rule was first codified in 1946 when the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure authorized comparatively liberal pre-trial disclosure
in the federal courts.' Florida, Idaho, and Maryland now have discovery
statutes patterned after the Federal Rules.' In addition, statutes allow-
ing a limited measure of pre-trial inspection have been enacted in several
other states.8
A recent Montana case is illustrative of decisions which create doubt
as to the status of discovery where there is no statute.! The actual holding
is only that under the facts no discovery should be granted. However, the
court did indicate that perhaps, if a proper showing is made, the trial judge
'4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
'The momentum for this trend is usually credited to the case of People ex rel. Lemon
v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84, 52 A.L.R. 200 (1927).
'See cases cited notes 33, 34, and 35 infra. No cases in point have been found in
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina
and Wyoming.
'Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 2-48 P.2d 287 (1952) ; State v. Kupis, 37 Del. 27,
179 Atl. 640 (1935) ; People v. Kuberacki, 310 Mich. 162, 16 N.W.2d 703 (1944) ;
State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912) ; Territory
v. McFarlane, 7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894) ; May v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 2, 83
S.W.2d 338 (1935) ; Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939).
'Howell v. State, 220 Ark. 278, 247 S.W.2d 952 (1952) ; State ex rel. Keast v. Dis-
trict Court, 342 P.2d 1071 (Mont. 1959) ; Bass v. State, 191 Tenn. 259, 231 S.W.2d
707 (1950) ; Steensland v. Happmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934).
'Rule 16 provides: "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers,
documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or ob-
tained from others by seizure or by nroep.%s iinrwn n showing that the itemq Rnght
may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and
of taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions
as are just." For a discussion of this rule see Note, 67 HARV. L. Rzv. 492 (1954),
and Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA.
L. Rzv. 221 (1957).
TFLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.18 (1959) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1530 (Supp. 1959) ; MD.
ANN. CoDz, Rules of Proc., Rule 728 (1957).
'Apiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 195 (1956) (documentary evi-
dence). At least four states provide for inspection of grand jury minutes: CAl.
PEN. CODE § 925; IOWA CODE § 772.4 (1950) ; Ky. CRIM. CODE PROC. § 110 (1958);
MINN. STAT. § 628.04 (1953).98tate ex rel. Keast v. District Court, 342 P.2d 1071 (Mont. 1959).
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would have inherent power to grant such a motion. Two justices vigorous-
ly opposed ordering any pre-trial inspections without remedial legislation.'
Before considering the bases for pre-trial discovery in the absence of
statute, it may be well to consider briefly the desirability of criminal dis-
covery and to review certain limitations already imposed upon this pro-
cedure.
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DISCOVERY
The often made objection to pre-trial discovery is that it affords the
defendant an opportunity to manufacture refutations and encourages false
alibis.' Other objections are the fear of loss or destruction of evidence,'
lack of mutuality," and the adequacy of existing procedural safeguards."'
While the problem of perjury is present in any criminal proceeding
it is difficult to see how disclosure would materially increase this threat.
If the defendant is guilty he is familiar with the details of the crime and
can fabricate accordingly. It is the innocent accused who is most likely
to be unaware of the facts that pre-trial inspection could disclose.' The
danger of loss or destruction of state's evidence could be removed by proper
procedural precautions. Nor can lack of mutuality be seriously urged
since discovery by the state would infringe the defendant's constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination.
The policy of the law to give every man accused of crime a reasonable
opportunity to prepare his defense is the foundation for criminal dis-
covery." Furthermore, conviction by unfair concealment and surprise is
not consonant with the presumption of innocence., Other arguments ad-
vanced for discovery are that it is required by basic fairness and justice,"
it avoids delay at trial,' and that it is needed to cope with the growing
complexity of issues in criminal trials.'
Although it is true that the defendant has a right to inspection of
evidence upon its introduction at the trial, and this may be sufficient in
most cases, still to combat some damaging evidence may require extensive
"In the special concurring opinion of Justice Bottomly the following appears: "The
only such exercise of 'inherent power' is by Almighty God, and certainly no court
or judge thereof may presume to exercise such omnipotent authority or power."
Id. at 1076.
'E.g., State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So. 2d 340 (1954), and cases collected in
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 207 (1928).
1Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939).
"State v. Hail, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918).
"May v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 2, 83 S.W.2d 338 (1935).
"Dean Wigmore's reply to the contention that criminal discovery would encourage
perjury is as follows: "The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such
an opportunity is no reason for committing the injustice of refusing the honest
accused a fair means of clearing himself. That argument is outworn; it was the
basis (and with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the criminal law to allow
the accused to produce any witnesses at all." 6 WIoMoRE, EViDF-NCm § 1863 at 488
(3d ed. 1940).
"For example, see Federal Rule 16, note 6 supra.
"State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945).
"sIbid.
"'State v. Naething, 318 Mo. 531, 300 S.W. 829 (1927).
-"Sttae ex. rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100 (1932).
"Financial fraud, anti-trust violations, and conspiracy cases all require extensive
investigation and research.
[Vol. 21,
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examination and investigation. However, just as total denial of pre-trial
disclosure may work injustice in a particular case, so may discovery un-
limited in scope seriously hamper the state in its preparation and conduct
of the case. Thus all jurisdictions recognizing pre-trial discovery have in
varying degree imposed limitations upon its use.
THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
Most states permitting inspection of the prosecution's evidence require
that the evidence be admissible at trial. ' Other jurisdictions have con-
strued or drawn their statutes to exclude confessions, ' expert reports,' or
statements of witnesses.' California and Washington, on the other hand,
are not restricted by the "admissibility at trial" test. As a result, dis-
closure has been allowed of F.B.I. reports,2' of a tape recording of an inter-
rogation of the accused, ' of the name of an informer and his present where-
abouts, ' and even of witnesses' statements although not signed or otherwise
acknowledged. ' The California position on the scope of judicial discretion
to order pre-trial discovery appears in the leading case of People v. Riser,'
wherein it is stated :'
Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept
confidential for the purpose of effective law enforcement, the state
has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that
can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no
interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not
been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as
the evidence permits. To deny flatly any right of production on
the ground that an imbalance would be created between the ad-
vantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of the
true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts.
This liberal view, as noted before, is not shared by most courts. To
illustrate, in a recent Pennsylvania case' the prosecution was ordered to
make available to the defendant before trial a gun, allegedly the murder
weapon, articles seized by the police, and photographs of fingerprints, if
any, on the gun. The district attorney petitioned the supreme court for a
writ of prohibition. The court modified the order and held that the dis-
trict attorney should not be required to make available the photographs of
fingerprints. The only reason given for this action was that the defendant
'People v. Preston, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Kings County Ct. 1958). See generally Dowling,
Pre-Trial Inspection of Prosecution's Evidence by Defendant, 53 DicK. L. REV. 301
(1949).
'Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940) (confession held not tangible
evidence under statute).
24IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1530 (Supp. 1959).
25Statutes cited note 7 supra.2 State v. Thompson, 338 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1959).
'McAllister v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 2d 297, 331 P.2d 654 (1958).
'2Castiel v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 2d 710, 328 P.2d 476 (1958).
'Funk v. Superior Court, 340 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1959). For a complete review of the
progress of criminal discovery in California, see Parsons, Pre-Trial Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 19 LAw. GuILD REv. 46 (1959).
3047 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).3Id., 305 P.2d at 13.
"'DiJoseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958). For a comprehensive analysis
of the limits of criminal discovery see Note, 6 UTAH L. REv. 531 (1959).
1960] NOTES
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is not being denied anything needed to ascertain the truth. This modifica-
tion seems to be an unwarranted limitation upon the trial court's discre-
tion. It ignores the possibility that the defendant may want to prepare his
own expert to testify. In any event, it does not appear how such a request
if granted would hinder the prosecution or in any way tend to subvert the
system of criminal law.
SOURCE OF POWER TO GRANT DISCOVERY
IN CRIMINAL CASES
As indicated previously, the majority of American jurisdictions in the
absence of statute have found a discretionary power in trial courts to com-
pel pre-trial inspections. Generally, three sources for this power have
been asserted.
Inherent Power of Trial Courts
The majority of states allowing pre-trial discovery without statute rely
on the inherent power of courts. While some decisions clearly recognize in-
herent power to compel disclosure,' others merely imply recognition either
by postulating a discretion in the trial court" or by analogizing to civil
inspection statutes85
Inherent powers of a court have been described variously as those pow-
ers that are "essential," '. "necessary,'' or "indispensable,"' to a court's
existence and protection, and to the due administration of justice. Al-
though some judges reject the inherent power theory," in most instances
this conflict may be reduced to one of definition. Strictly speaking, there
is no such thing as inherent power, if by that is meant either an authority
possessed without its being derived from another, or a faculty of doing
a thing without receiving that faculty from another. A court has only such
power and jurisdiction as is directly granted by law and such further
powers as ought to be inferred therefrom." The difference between in-
"OState ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954) ; State v.
Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647. (1947) ; State ex rel. Regan v. Superior Court, 153
A.2d 403 (N.H. 1959) ; State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1957).
"Mabry v. State, 110 So.2d 250 (Ala. App. 1959) ; United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska
670 (1922) ; People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956) ; Daly v. Dimock, 55
Conn. 579, 12 Atl. 405 (1887) ; People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914) ;
Weer v. State, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941) ; State v. Burris, 198 Iowa 1156,
198 N.W. 82 (1924) ; State v. Furthmeyer, 128 Kan. 317, 277 Pac. 1019 (1929) ;
Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911) ; Commonwealth v.
Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 (1946) ; Bellew v. State, 106 So.2d 146 (Miss.
1958) ; Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944) ; People ex rel. Lemon
v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84, 52 A.L.R. 200 (1927) ; State v. Cala,
66 Ohio App. 535, 35 N.E.2d 758 (1940) ; DiJoseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d
187 (1958) ; State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 195 AtI. 497 (1937) ; State v. Lack, 118
Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950) ; State v. Truba, 88 Vt. 557, 93 AtI. 293 (1915);
State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 Pac. 157 (1895) ; State v. Tabet, 136 W. Va. 239,
67 S.E.2d 326 (1951).
"'State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100 (1932); State
ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W.2d 459 (1930).
*Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 57 So. 806 (1912).
"State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954).
'McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 129 N.Y. 50, 29 N.E. 235 (1891).
'For example, see Justice Bottomly's special concurring opinion in State ex rel.
Keast v. District Court, 342 P.2d 1071 (Mont. 1959).
"°Ex parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 S.W.2d 270 (1939).
[Vol. 21,
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herent power and jurisdiction is important to note. Jurisdiction is con-
ferred by a constitution and statutes, while inherent power is that which
is necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction.'  In-
herent power, therefore, may be defined as that power arising upon the
creation of a court, because it is implied in the concept of a court.
In this connection, the Washington Supreme Court, quoting Justice
Works' treatise on Courts and Their Jurisdiction, has stated:"
All courts of general and superior jurisdiction are possessed of cer-
tain inherent powers, not conferred upon them by express provi-
sions of law, but which are necessary to their existence and the
proper discharge of the duties imposed upon them by law.
The New York Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the power of a
court to compel one who sues for personal injuries to submit to a physical
examination, made this statement :"4
We cannot say that the exercise of the power claimed might not in
some cases promote the cause of justice .... But we have to deal
only with the question of the power of the courts in the absence of
any legislation .... Its existence is not indispensable to the due
administration of justice.
Thus the exercise of any inherent power seems properly limited to
situations where the existence of the power claimed is essential to the due
adminisftation of justice. Clear instances of this are: power to punish
for contempt;" power to grant an appeal, where the appeal within the time
limited by law is prevented by the fraud of the appelleee or his counsel;"
and, the power to correct clerical errors in judgments."
Of the few decisions clearly enunciating the doctrine of inherent power
to compel discovery," only one does more than summarily treat that con-
cept. In State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court," the Arizona Supreme
Court delineates the scope of inherent power, and enumerates matters illus-
trative of it. The court then frames the basic issue with this question:
" [W] as the order of inspection so necessary to the due administration of
justice as to fall within the scope of these inherent powers?'" Their af-
firmative finding is based solely upon the citation of cases that do not
answer the question. It is true that the majority of the courts confronted
with the problem of criminal discovery and having no statute governing
the matter have recognized the inherent power of the trial court to enter
these orders, but they have done so without really considering the funda-
mental issue. A case often cited for the proposition that courts of general
jurisdiction have inherent power to compel discovery is State v. Haas.'
"State ex rel. Andrews v. Superior Court, 39 Ariz. 242, 5 P.2d 192 (1931).
42In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 72 Pac. 710, 712 (1903).
"McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 129 N.Y. 50,29 N.E. 235, 238 (1891).
"Ea, parte Wetzel, 243 Ala. 130, 8 So. 2d 824 (1942).
'
5Smythe v. Boswell, 117 Ind. 365, 20 N.E. 263 (1889).
"Edgar State Bank v. Long, 85 Mont. 225, 278 Pac. 108 (1929).
"See cases cited note 33 supra.
"78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954).
"'Id., 275 P.2d at 889.0188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1947).
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Although in that case the Maryland court took pains to review the decided
cases the rationale of the decision seems limited to the following:'
There can be no doubt that the recognition of the right in a trial
court to permit the defendant to examine his confession in advance
of the trial was not recognized at common law. But law is a growth
and a great many matters, commonplace to us now, were not
thought of many years ago . . . the tendency in the courts of this
country is to permit discretion in the trial judge.
From an examination of this case and others it is evident that the courts
there did no more than assume inherent power extended to discovery, put-
ting forth the proposition almost axiomatically.
Without a court's inherent power to punish for contempt, obviously
due administration of justice would be impossible. Yet, while it can be
argued that pre-trial discovery would facilitate due administration of jus-
tice, even in the most extreme cases the defendant in a criminal action
may still inspect the evidence upon its introduction at the trial. If neces-
sary, an extended recess could be granted to permit a detailed inspection.
But to rely upon the inherent power of trial courts as a foundation for
criminal discovery seems out of line with the traditional view of that con-
cept. As the New York Court of Appeals wrote with reference to an
analogous power there claimed: "Its existence is not indispensable to the
due administration of justice.' '
Constitutional Right to Discovery
The United States Supreme Court has rejected in two recent cases
contentions that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment re-
quires pre-trial discovery.' Certiorari has been denied where discovery
was refused in at least two other states.' In addition, California has held
that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have no application to state
courts, and cannot be subsumed under the fourteenth amendment as a
limitation on state action.'
In State v. Dorsey' the Louisiana court found that defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair trial included pre-trial inspection of his written
confession. This is the only decision found giving criminal discovery a
constitutional basis. However, the Dorsey case has been strictly limited to
written confessions."
Statutory Interpretation
Many state codes contain a statute making the law of evidence in civil
actions also the law of evidence in criminal actions. In the only case
aId., 51 A.2d at 653.
52Supra note 43.
'Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1968).
"Lopez v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 16, 252 S.W.2d 701, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952);
State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 774, 153 P.2d 297, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 878 (1945).
'People v. Kross, 112 Cal. App. 2d 602, 247 P.2d 44 (1952).
'207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
"State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So. 2d 169 (1955) ; State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71
So. 2d 340 (1954).
[Vol. 21,
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clearly so holding,' the Oregon Supreme Court decided that such a pro-
vision" was broad enough to include the authority vested in the court by
the civil inspection laws. The court was influenced by Justice Cardozo's
somewhat equivocal statement in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court,'
that "the provisions of the Civil Codes for the discovery of documents are
not rules of evidence in the strict sense. They are closely akin, however,
to such rules, for they govern and define the remedies whereby evidence
is made available."
This seemingly strained statutory construction has been rejected by the
Arizona Supreme Court.'
CONCLUSION
The defendant in a criminal case has no right to a pre-trial inspection
of the prosecution's evidence. In the majority of jurisdictions discovery is
now permitted but entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the absence of statute this discretion has been founded upon either an
unwarranted extension of the doctrine of inherent power or doubtful
statutory construction. It is now generally felt that pre-trial discovery is
a needed addition to criminal procedure, and that its application should be
extended except where the prosecution can show the likelihood of substantial
harm. But, to accomplish this, it would seem that comprehensive remedial
legislation,' rather than the development of an unworkable body of case
law founded upon questionable premises, is the better way.
DAVID 0. DEGRANDPRE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL INSPECTIONS*
Recent years have brought a marked increase in civil inspections.' Big
city slums, with their attendant health and safety hazards, are no new
problem, but in recent years new concern has been shown for finding some
solution to this urban blight. Some answers are spectacular, like wholesale
redevelopment; others are more prosaic, such as legislation giving public
"'Sate v. Lelanda,.10 ... ,22 .. d75 1-1
soORE. CODE A N. § 26-932 (1930) (now ORE. Rm. STAT. ch. 136, § 510 (1953)).
-245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84, 86, 52 A.L.R. 200, 206 (1927).
"State ex. rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954).
"Federal Rule 16 would serve as a useful guide, but any future legislation should
also permit discovery of expert reports, confessions, and statements of witnesses in
the hands of the prosecution.
*This Note is an outgrowth of the 1959 National Moot Court Competition, sponsored
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The hypothetical case
posed for argument raised the issues discussed herein. The joint authors of this
note, and in addition Arthur Ayers, participated in the law school intramural moot
court competition, using the same factual situation. Thereafter, the moot court
team participated in regional competition at Moscow, Idaho, and placed second.
'As used herein, "civil inspections" means those inspections conducted by state or
municipal authorities primarily to ascertain and correct a particular deplorable
situation, rather than to punish a person for a violation of the law,
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